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THE CORROSIVE COMBINATION OF 
NONPROFIT MONOPOLIES AND U.S.-
STYLE HEALTH INSURANCE: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR ANTITRUST AND 
MERGER POLICY 
BARAK D. RICHMAN* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Rising health care costs are a matter of universal alarm, and in addition to 
the popular causal explanations,1 Clark Havighurst’s and my centerpiece paper 
for this symposium (hereafter Distributive Injustices) identifies a new culprit: 
“the corrosive combination of nonprofit monopolies and U.S.-style health 
insurance.”2  Not only has market power in the health care sector, which we 
observe pervades the industry, unleashed a torrent of supracompetitive—and 
even supramonopoly—prices, but much of the recent rise in health costs is 
directly attributable “to increasing supply-side market power as a result of 
hospital consolidations and the growth of provider organizations.”3  If this is so, 
one might expect help from federal antitrust enforcers to put a halt to growing 
hospital market power.  Unfortunately, antitrust enforcers have sustained a 
regrettable losing streak: though the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 
Department of Justice (DOJ), and state antitrust enforcers have mustered a 
number of ambitious challenges to proposed hospital mergers, their record in 
these challenges since 1994 contains seven losses and zero victories.4  The losing 
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 1. For a brief overview of commonly identified sources of rising health care expenditures, see 
HENRY J. AARON, SERIOUS AND UNSTABLE CONDITION 38–53 (1991) (attributing rising expenditures 
to the stimulation of demand through third-party payment, rising provider compensation, the aging of 
the American population, malpractice litigation, and (especially) the growth of expensive new 
technologies). 
 2. Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, Distributive Injustice(s) in American Health Care, 69 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 24 (Autumn 2006). 
 3. Id. at 18. 
 4. See FTC v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1047 (8th Cir. 1999); FTC v. Freeman 
Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, 273 (8th Cir. 1995); California v. Sutter Health Sys., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1085 (N.D. 
Cal. 2000), aff’d, 130 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (N.D. Cal. 2001); United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 
983 F. Supp. 121, 149 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1302–03 
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streak has been sufficiently severe to cause one knowledgeable commentator to 
suggest that “the role of antitrust law in monitoring the health care industry 
faces an increasingly uncertain, and perhaps diminishing, future.”5 
This paper aims to reinvigorate antitrust scrutiny of the health care industry 
by highlighting certain observations made in Distributive Injustices that have 
important implications for the antitrust debate over hospital market 
concentration.  That debate has revolved around, and has devolved into, the 
question of how nonprofit hospitals set prices.  Since 1994, courts have largely 
reasoned that because nonprofits, by law, may not distribute profits to 
shareholders, they do not (and would not) abuse market power like for-profit 
institutions and raise prices to monopoly levels.6  They have reached this 
conclusion while expressing substantial sympathy for nonprofit hospitals and 
hostility toward health care institutions that do seek profits, making 
declarations such as, “In the real world, hospitals are in the business of saving 
lives, and managed care organizations are in the business of saving dollars.”7  
Some judges and many academics retort that though nonprofits do not seek to 
maximize returns to shareholders, they seek returns of other kinds and 
therefore would utilize market power—including implementing monopoly 
prices—just as for-profit hospitals do.8 
Distributive Injustices brings a new perspective to this antitrust policy 
debate.  Like many academics, we warn of rising hospital consolidation as a 
source of rising prices, but we argue that the effects of market concentration are 
severely magnified because of U.S.-style private insurance.  We observe that 
assorted political, regulatory, and institutional constraints prevent U.S. insurers 
from denying coverage for health services, even if those services are priced at 
gouging levels.  Moreover, since the income tax exclusion induces employers to 
provide health insurance, workers remain largely unaware of these prices, even 
as they are the ultimate payers, and thus are not positioned to make informed 
decisions as to whether those prices exceed their willingness to pay.  As a result, 
U.S.-style insurance is unable and unwilling to confront providers with 
monopoly power and instead succumbs to inflated prices; meanwhile, the moral 
hazard that accompanies health insurance leads insurers to pay for inflated 
levels of consumption. 
Nonprofit monopolists, we submit, are equally as likely to translate their 
market power into inflated prices.  But our objection to nonprofit market power 
goes beyond the question of whether it leads to higher or lower prices—we also 
 
(W.D. Mich. 1996), aff’d, 121 F.3d 708 (6th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision); United States v. 
Mercy Health Servs., 902 F. Supp. 968, 989 (N.D. Iowa 1995), vacated as moot, 107 F.3d 632 (8th Cir. 
1997); In re Adventist Health Sys., 117 F.T.C. 224, 224 (1994). 
 5. Thomas L. Greaney, Whither Antitrust? The Uncertain Future of Competition Law in Health 
Care, HEALTH AFF., Mar.–Apr. 2002, at 185. 
 6. See infra Part II. 
 7. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. at 1302. 
 8. E.g., Judge Posner, infra note 16; Judge Tjoflat, infra note 17; Professors Dranove & Ludwick, 
infra note 63. 
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express concern that such power both reduces allocative efficiency and enables 
providers to avoid the scrutiny of market competition.  We warn that rising 
nonprofit market power allows nonprofits to “suck large amounts of cash out of 
the economy either to support ongoing health-related activities or to create new 
health facilities or new health-sector monopolies.”9  In doing so, these 
nonprofits not only do economic damage by subsidizing services of questionable 
value, but also do harm to certain democratic principles: 
Over time, this one-way flow of capital into the health sector has built enormous 
enterprises that can legally use their untaxed income and assets only for health-related 
activities, whatever the economy’s or the public sector’s or premium-paying 
individuals’ other needs.  Too little attention has been given, we submit, to the 
involuntary flow of substantial funds from premium payers into the coffers of 
powerful private institutions that are largely unsupervised and unconstrained with 
respect to their use of those resources.10 
This article takes up the plea to pay closer attention to those “powerful 
private institutions” and hopes to provoke renewed attention from antitrust 
policymakers and judges.  It begins by reviewing the treatment nonprofit 
hospitals have received in recent merger cases (“The Setting”11), discusses the 
academic quarreling over the merger rulings, in particular the debate 
surrounding the courts’ factual findings and empirical justifications (“The 
Debate”12), and then illustrates how we hope Distributive Injustices will refocus 
the debate over merger policy (“The Real Problem”13). 
II 
THE SETTING: COURTS’ PROTECTION OF NONPROFITS 
When courts are asked to review an FTC challenge to a proposed merger 
between nonprofit hospitals, they are ideally situated to comment on the 
consequences of nonprofit market power.  After all, proposed mergers between 
nonprofits, by definition, lead both to additional market concentration and to a 
stronger hand for nonprofits within that concentration, so the proposed mergers 
require courts to evaluate the potential benefits and harms created by the 
growth of nonprofits within increasing market concentration.  Consequently, 
these cases offer useful windows into how many courts view nonprofits. 
The central issue in many of these cases is whether nonprofit hospitals 
would use market power to inflate prices to supracompetitive levels, just as 
economic theory predicts a for-profit hospital would.  This issue is paramount 
when a proposed merger would otherwise be rejected if the resulting entity 
were a for-profit corporation, so the question becomes whether nonprofits 
deserve special treatment under the antitrust laws.  In an important 1986 
 
 9. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 2, at 23. 
 10. Id. 
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. See infra Part III. 
 13. See infra Part IV. 
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decision, Judge Richard Posner dismissed such an exception for nonprofits, 
remarking, “The adoption of the nonprofit form does not change human nature, 
as the courts have recognized in rejecting an implicit antitrust exemption for 
nonprofit enterprises.”14  Judge Posner went further to suggest that nonprofits 
might be even more likely than for-profits to charge supracompetitive prices 
and engage in anticompetitive conduct:  “Moreover, compelled as they are to 
treat charity cases while minimizing the cost to the taxpayers of supporting the 
hospital, public hospitals are under added pressure to charge high prices to their 
paying (or insured) patients, which may make collusion particularly attractive to 
these hospitals.”15 
A subsequent ruling from Judge Posner, in another FTC-challenged merger 
four years later, reiterated the same skepticism toward treating nonprofits 
differently from other hospitals: “We are aware of no evidence—and the 
defendants present none, only argument—that nonprofit suppliers of goods or 
services are more likely to compete vigorously than profit-making suppliers.  
Most people do not like to compete, and will seek ways of avoiding competition 
by agreement tacit or explicit . . . .”16  One year later, Judge Gerald Tjoflat 
expressed the same inclination to impose the antitrust laws with equal rigor to 
both nonprofits and for-profits.  Citing both of Judge Posner’s opinions, Judge 
Tjoflat concluded, “the nonprofit status of the acquiring firm will not, by itself, 
help a defendant overcome the presumption of illegality.”17 
In contrast, many recent court rulings in antitrust cases have been quite 
generous to nonprofit hospitals.18  The first antitrust opinion to take this 
position in recent decades was the 1989 ruling in United States v. Carilion Health 
System.19  In rejecting the FTC’s challenge to a proposed merger between 
nonprofit hospitals, the court ruled that the merger would improve the 
efficiency of both hospitals and thus would “strengthen, rather than reduce, 
competition.”20  Then, the court continued, 
 
 14. Hosp. Corp. of Am. v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1390 (7th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). 
 15. Id. at 1391. 
 16. United States v. Rockford Mem’l Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1285 (7th Cir. 1990).  Judge Posner also 
reiterated that nonprofits are likely to pose greater danger to competition than for-profits, adding 
“[t]he ideology of nonprofit enterprise is cooperative rather than competitive.  If the managers of 
nonprofit enterprises are less likely to strain after that last penny of profit, they may be less prone to 
engage in profit-maximizing collusion but by the same token less prone to engage in profit-maximizing 
competition.”  Id. 
 17. FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1224 (11th Cir. 1991).  In addition, Judge Tjoflat 
invoked National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 100 n.2 (1984), to conclude 
that “the Supreme Court has rejected the notion that nonprofit corporations act under such a different 
set of incentives than for-profit corporations that they are entitled to an implicit exemption from the 
antitrust laws.”  Univ. Health, 938 F.2d at 1224. 
 18. Richard Schmalbeck observes in this volume that nonprofit hospitals enjoy a similar generosity 
from tax courts and IRS rulings.  Richard L. Schmalbeck, The Impact of Tax-Exempt Status: The 
Supply-Side Subsidies, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 121, 124–27 (Autumn 2006). 
 19. 707 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Va. 1989), aff’d, 892 F.2d 1042 (4th Cir. 1989) (unpublished table 
decision). 
 20. Id. at 849. 
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Defendants’ nonprofit status also militates in favor of finding their combination 
reasonable.  Defendants’ boards of directors both include business leaders who can be 
expected to demand that the institutions use the savings achieved through the merger 
to reduce hospital charges, . . . . [T]he court concludes that [defendants’] nonprofit 
status weighs in favor of their merger’s being reasonable.21 
The neutral observer might consider this statement to be largely 
innocuous—particularly since the court provided many alternative holdings that 
did not rely on the tax status of the merging entities and based its analysis 
predominantly on the definition of the hospitals’ geographic market.22  
Moreover, when the Fourth Circuit upheld the lower court’s ruling, it did so in 
an unpublished opinion that did not mention the district judge’s assertion that 
boards will restrain a nonprofit’s managers from capitalizing on market power.23  
But the issue emerged again in 1995, in FTC v. Freeman Hospital.24  This case, 
like Carilion, involved a proposed merger of two nonprofit hospitals in which 
the parties disputed the geographic and product markets,25 and the court’s ruling 
to permit the merger rested primarily on its adoption of the defendants’ market 
definitions.  Without citing Carilion, the court reached almost the identical 
conclusion, though in more sweeping terms.  The court wrote, 
Arguably, a private nonprofit hospital that is sponsored and directed by the local 
community is similar to a consumer cooperative.  It is highly unlikely that a 
cooperative will arbitrarily raise prices merely to earn higher profits because the 
owners of such an organization are also its consumers.  Similarly, if a nonprofit 
organization is controlled by the very people who depend on it for service, there is no 
rational economic incentive for such an organization to raise its prices to the 
monopoly level even if it has the power to do so.26 
In applying this principle to the merging entities, the court then concluded, “it 
would not be in their best economic interest to permit prices to rise beyond a 
normal competitive level.”27 
Even though Freeman issued a sweeping generalization on the nature of 
nonprofit-hospital pricing policies, it—like Carilion—did not rest its conclusion 
exclusively on the merged entity’s being nonprofit.  Moreover, also like 
Carilion, the Freeman ruling was upheld in a brief ruling that did not discuss the 
relevance of nonprofit status to competitive behavior.28  Again, one might 
 
 21. Id. 
 22. See id. at 847–48. 
 23. See United States v. Carilion Health Sys., No. 89-2625, 1989 WL 157282 (4th Cir. Nov. 29, 
1989). 
 24. 911 F. Supp. 1213 (W.D. Mo. 1995), aff’d, 69 F.3d 260 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 25. Under the FTC’s alternative market definitions, the proposed merger would create a market 
with a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of between 2288 and 4356.  Id. at 1222.  The hospitals 
argued that the merger would result in an HHI between 1322 and 1624.  Id.  Under the Department of 
Justice’s merger guidelines, a market is not “highly concentrated” until the HHI reaches 1800.  Dep’t of 
Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 41,558 (Sept. 10, 
1992), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz_book/hmg1.html. 
 26. Freeman Hosp., 911 F. Supp. at 1222 (citations omitted). 
 27. Id. at 1227. 
 28. See FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260 (8th Cir. 1995).  The court briefly confirmed that the 
hospitals’ nonprofit status did not defeat the FTC’s jurisdiction in the case.  Id. at 266–67. 
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consider these comments little more than insignificant dicta, but the language in 
Freeman—like the proverbial “loaded weapon”29—was on hand for a dispute 
involving a dramatically different set of facts.30 
Those different facts arose in FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp.31  
Butterworth again involved a proposed merger between two nonprofit hospitals, 
but unlike the rulings in Carilion and Freeman, the court in Butterworth 
accepted the FTC’s market definition and agreed that the resulting hospital 
market would be highly concentrated.32  Nonetheless, the court permitted the 
merger because “nonprofit hospitals do not operate in the same manner as 
profit maximizing businesses.”33  And in so deciding, the court cited the excerpt 
from Freeman quoted above.34 
In a lengthy opinion, the court supported its distinction between for-profits 
and nonprofits on two separate, but interrelated, grounds.  First, it concluded 
from expert testimony that for nonprofit hospitals, “market concentration 
appears to be positively correlated not with higher prices, but with lower 
prices.”35  And second, it determined that “the involvement of prominent 
community and business leaders on the boards of [both] hospitals can be 
expected to bring real accountability to price structuring,” especially since those 
leaders have “employees [who] depend on these facilities for services [and] 
have demonstrated their genuine commitment to serve the greater Grand 
Rapids community.”36  The Sixth Circuit affirmed the decision for the hospitals 
in a terse, unpublished per curiam ruling, concluding “[t]he record presented 
 
 29. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 30. It appears that the Freeman opinion did not capture widespread attention.  In United States v. 
Mercy Health Services, another challenge to a proposed merger of two nonprofit hospitals, the court 
wrote, “The hospitals have also asserted as a defense their non-profit status and procompetitive intent.  
The hospitals cite United States v. Carilion Health for the proposition that the non-profit status of the 
hospitals can be considered in determining whether the hospitals would act in an anticompetitive 
manner.  The government points out, this is a questionable legal proposition.  No other courts have 
explicitly adopted this theory of defense.”  902 F. Supp 968, 989 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (citation abridged), 
vacating as moot 107 F.3d 632 (8th Cir. 1997). 
 31. 946 F. Supp. 1285 (W.D. Mich. 1996), aff’d, 121 F.3d 708 (6th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table 
decision). 
 32. Id. at 1294.  For general acute inpatient care, the post-merger HHI would be between 2767 and 
4521, reflecting a gain of 1064 to 1889 points as a result of the merger.  For primary inpatient care, the 
post-merger HHI would range from 4506 to 5079, reflecting a gain of 1675 to 2001 points.  The court 
concluded that “the proposed merger would result in a significant increase in the concentration of 
power in two relevant markets, and produce an entity controlling an undue percentage share of each of 
those markets.”  Id.  For concentration standards under the Department of Justice’s merger guidelines, 
see supra note 25. 
 33. Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1296. 
 34. Id. (citing FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 911 F. Supp. 1213, 1222 (W.D. Mo. 1995), aff’d, 69 F.3d 260 
(8th Cir. 1995)). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 1297, 1302.  In addition, the court gave significant weight to a “Community 
Commitment” that the hospitals signed, which pledged to freeze certain prices, limit profit margins, and 
maintain a commitment to serve the medically needy.  Id. at 1298.  The document, which the FTC 
regarded as “unenforceable, illusory, or inadequate,” was designed “to assuage any purchaser concerns 
and to reiterate [the hospitals’] strong conviction that the purpose and intent of the transaction is to 
reduce costs.”  Id. (alteration in original). 
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here does not leave us with a firm conviction that the district court erred in its 
analysis of the facts.”37 
The Butterworth opinion was a sweeping victory for nonprofit hospitals and, 
by carving out a different standard for nonprofits in the application of antitrust 
laws, understandably sparked some heated academic commentary.  One leading 
antitrust scholar called the ruling a “rejection of conventional norms that guide 
competition law” and a decision that “turned antitrust law on its head.”38  
Another critic charged that Butterworth “push[ed] the envelope of antitrust 
enforcement with an adherence to a paradigm of the health care industry that is, 
at least, in tension with the pro-market mandate of antitrust law and, at most, 
fundamentally inconsistent with the dictates of antitrust law” and warned that 
the ruling “may undermine the ability of the enforcement agencies to apply the 
procompetitive policies of the antitrust law—for all their substantive and 
symbolic importance—to an important component of the health care 
marketplace.”39 
Butterworth might also signal the depth of difficulties that confront antitrust 
enforcement in the health care sector.  In addition to its evident departure from 
traditional applications of competition law, the Butterworth opinion reflects the 
genuine hostility some judges have to subjecting health care providers to 
competition.  The ruling concluded with some revealing language: 
Managed care organizations’ interest in maintaining a competitive edge cannot be 
allowed to trump either hospitals’ conscientious endeavors to continue to provide 
comprehensive, high quality health care in this rapidly evolving field, or the 
consuming public’s right to receive the same. 
Permitting defendant hospitals to achieve the efficiencies of scale that would clearly 
result from the proposed merger would enable the board of directors of the combined 
entity to continue the quest for establishment of world-class health facilities in West 
Michigan, a course the Court finds clearly and unequivocally would ultimately be in 
the best interests of the consuming public as a whole.40 
In short, the court concluded simply that competition itself does not serve the 
public interest.  To the contrary, it concluded that the public benefits most when 
hospitals grow and dominate a market.  The court in Freeman, in orally denying 
the FTC’s motion for a temporary restraining order to enjoin the proposed 
merger, had even harsher words for FTC officials: 
I don’t feel that the Federal Trade Commission has shown sufficient factual basis that 
they are entitled to a TRO . . . . I don’t think you’ve got any business being in here.  I 
don’t see how the Federal Trade Commission can claim there is lack of competition 
when there [are] four or five hospitals in the area, and reducing it by one is not going 
 
 37. FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., No. 96-2440, 1997 WL 420543, at *3 (6th Cir. July 8, 1997). 
 38. Greaney, supra note 5, at 188. 
 39. James F. Blumstein, The Application of Antitrust Doctrine to the Healthcare Industry: The 
Interweaving of Empirical and Normative Issues, 31 IND. L. REV. 91, 117 (1998).  Though academic 
defenders of Butterworth were fewer in number, some did weigh in, including one who praised the 
court for using expert testimony and empirical evidence to “reconsider[] old presumptions in the light 
of new evidence.”  Michael S. Jacobs, Presumptions, Damn Presumptions and Economic Theory: The 
Role of Empirical Evidence in Hospital Merger Analysis, 31 IND. L. REV. 125, 142 (1998). 
 40. 946 F. Supp. at 1302. 
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to wipe out competition. . . . It looks to me like Washington D.C. once again thinks 
they know better what’s going on in southwest Missouri.  I think they ought to stay in 
D.C.41 
Thus, antitrust enforcers have more than precedents such as Butterworth to 
combat.  They also must fight against strong judicial predispositions. 
The FTC’s failed challenge against the Butterworth merger was one of 
seven such losses, unaccompanied by any victories, from 1994 to 2000.42  The 
string of losses has alarmed many antitrust policymakers43 and has caused some 
to wonder whether the core principles of competition law are being abandoned 
in favor of political expedience and favorable predispositions toward the health 
care sector.44  But the FTC has persisted, and another chapter is now being 
written in In re Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp., in which the FTC is 
challenging a completed merger of an academic and a community hospital that 
since 2000 have been operated by a nonprofit corporation.45  On October 21, 
2005, the FTC’s chief administrative law judge issued an initial decision 
ordering divestiture of the merger.  Included among its findings of fact was that 
the corporation’s nonprofit status failed to restrain price increases, alter 
management’s profit-maximizing incentives, or induce the board to monitor 
management’s pricing decisions.46  The decision has been appealed to the FTC 
Commissioners, who may adopt, modify, reject, or ignore the decision 
altogether, but the FTC’s decision to pursue this retrospective merger review 
has been described as “a renewed commitment to hospital merger 
enforcement.”47  Moreover, “given how much the FTC has invested in this case 
in terms of time, resources and reputation, the importance of this case to the 
future of the FTC’s health care antitrust enforcement mission, the FTC cannot 
afford to reverse course. . . . The high stakes involved virtually guarantee that 
 
 41. FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, 263 (8th Cir. 1995) (alteration and omissions in original) 
(quoting from the district court’s oral denial of the temporary restraining order). 
 42. FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMPROVING HEALTH CARE: A DOSE 
OF COMPETITION, ch. 4, at 1 (2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/health_care/ 
204694.pdf, at 165. 
 43. See, e.g., William M. Sage, Protecting Competition and Consumers: A Conversation with 
Timothy J. Muris, HEALTH AFF., Nov.–Dec. 2003, at 101, 103 (quoting the former Chairman of the 
Federal Trade Commission as saying, “In hospital merger cases, the government is zero for the last 
seven.  I don’t know the specifics of every case, but what’s striking is the zero.  I can certainly accept the 
idea that the government should not have won them all.  But it seems very unlikely the government 
should have lost them all”). 
 44. See Greaney, supra note 5, at 193. 
 45. See Complaint, In re Evanston Northwest Healthcare Corp., No. 9315 (Fed. Trade Comm’n 
Feb. 10, 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0110234/040210emhcomplaint.pdf; Federal 
Trade Comm’n, Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp. and ENH Medical Group, Inc., 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9315/index.htm (last visited May 9, 2006) (showing all actions taken in 
the case). 
 46. In re Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp., No. 9315, at 120–22 (Fed. Trade Comm’n Oct. 
20, 2005) (ALJ initial decision), http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9315/051020initialdecision.pdf. 
 47. Michael R. Bissegger, FTC ALJ Finds That Evanston Hospital Merger Violated Antitrust Law 
and Orders Divestiture (Oct. 28, 2005), http://www.ebglaw.com/article_1198.html. 
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this case will continue to be hard-fought and is likely to become a bellwether of 
future government antitrust enforcement in hospital mergers.”48 
III 
THE DEBATE: ACADEMIC RESPONSES TO WAYWARD COURTS 
Judicial sympathy for nonprofit hospitals in merger cases, and tolerance of 
their market power, is largely driven by a confidence that nonprofit market 
concentration does not lead to higher prices.  Such a view is not entirely 
unfounded, and the courts in Carilion, Freeman, and Butterworth relied on 
expert testimony and some academic scholarship—in particular, the work of 
William J. Lynk—to reach their conclusions that nonprofits would not impose 
monopoly prices.49  The reliability of this research and testimony has occupied 
the focus of the debate over nonprofit-hospital mergers. 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. The court in Carilion relied on expert testimony to arrive at two key factual findings that 
favored the defendants.  First, the court concluded, “as a general rule hospital rates are lower, the fewer 
the number of hospitals in an area”—in other words, nonprofit market concentration is correlated with 
lower prices.  707 F. Supp. at 846.  And second, “charitable, nonprofit hospitals tend to charge lower 
rates than for-profit hospitals,” suggesting that nonprofits do not utilize market power like for-profits.  
Id.  The court offered little analysis explaining how it arrived at these conclusions but mentioned in a 
footnote that the FTC’s expert witness, who predicted that the merger would increase prices, “did not 
explain the basis of his findings to the court’s satisfaction,” and that the defendant’s witness “raised 
serious questions about [the FTC’s] method of analysis.”  Id. at 846 n.6.  The defendants’ expert 
witness, David Eisenstadt, was also employed by the Butterworth defendants.  See FTC v. Butterworth 
Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1290 (W.D. Mich. 1996), aff’d, 121 F.3d 708 (6th Cir. 1997). 
In Freeman, the court dedicated slightly more of its opinion to exploring the nature and economic 
effects of nonprofits and rested its analysis chiefly on a published article by William Lynk, who also 
served as the defendants’ chief expert witness.  See FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 911 F. Supp. 1213, 1222 
(W.D. Mo. 1995), aff’d, 69 F.3d 260 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing William J. Lynk, Property Rights and the 
Presumption of Merger Analysis, 39 ANTITRUST BULL. 363, 377 (1994) [hereinafter Lynk, Property 
Rights]).  The court drew upon the article to support the proposition, “if a nonprofit organization is 
controlled by the very people who depend on it for service, there is no rational economic incentive for 
such an organization to raise its prices to the monopoly level even if it has the power to do so.”  Id.; see 
also supra note 26 and accompanying text.  It then examined “who controls the hospitals” and, after 
revealing that twelve of the Board’s eighteen members were owners, employees, or retirees of local 
businesses, concluded, “the vast majority of the combined Board of Trustees is comprised of persons 
who indirectly represent the interests of hospital consumers.”  Id. at 1222–23.  Consequently, the court 
reasoned, “it would not be in these individual Board member[s’] best economic interest to permit prices 
to be raised beyond a normal competitive level.”  Id. at 1223; see also id. at 1227 (reiterating the same 
conclusion). 
The Butterworth opinion engaged in a more empirical analysis to determine how nonprofits set 
prices.  Similar to the court in Freeman, it began by citing another Lynk article, which concluded from 
an empirical study of California hospital markets that “on balance increased nonprofit market share is 
associated with lower, not higher, prices.” 946 F. Supp. at 1295 (quoting William J. Lynk, Nonprofit 
Hospital Mergers and the Exercise of Market Power, 38 J.L. & ECON. 437, 459 (1995) [hereinafter Lynk, 
Hospital Mergers]).  The court then accepted expert testimony from Lynk, who was also an expert 
witness for the Butterworth defendants, that analyzed the Grand Rapids hospital market that included 
the merging parties.  Lynk “concluded that in Michigan, too, higher hospital concentration is associated 
with lower nonprofit hospital prices.”  Id.  Finding this evidence consistent with pledges from the 
hospitals’ chairmen (who “have community interests at heart”) that the merger was intended to lower 
health care costs and to improve quality, and not to increase prices, the court concluded that the merger 
would enhance consumer welfare.  See id. at 1296–97, 1301–03.  (These findings were also consistent 
with observations the judge himself made during tours of the hospitals, in which he noted that the 
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Lynk’s 1994 article, Property Rights and the Presumptions of Merger 
Analysis, cited in Freeman, summarizes the empirical literature that investigated 
hospital pricing behavior and concludes that “[t]he results of these research 
efforts support, on balance, the proposition that nonprofit hospitals behave 
differently than for-profit hospitals.  In particular, they support the proposition 
that nonprofit hospitals set lower prices than otherwise comparable for-profit 
hospitals.”50  Lynk explains these findings through the lens of “property rights”: 
because the primary “property right” of for-profit firms—the investor’s 
individual share—is not present in the nonprofit, the incentive to maximize the 
value of that share is absent.51  Though the paper does not present any original 
empirical findings, and thus does not provide support for a particular theory of 
pricing behavior, Lynk argues that the survey of prior research is sufficient to 
challenge those who believe that nonprofits maximize like other hospitals.  
Economists and antitrust policymakers, therefore, should at least hesitate 
before presuming that maximizing shareholder value—and the associated 
behaviors of seeking profit-maximizing prices—drives nonprofit behavior.52 
In Nonprofit Hospital Mergers and the Exercise of Market Power, published 
in 1995 and cited in Butterworth, Lynk reports his own empirical test of whether 
nonprofits price lower than for-profits.  Studying a cross-section of California 
hospitals, he examines 1989 pricing data for the ten most prevalent Diagnosis-
Related Groups (DRGs), 1988 hospital-level data (including patient 
admissions, proportion of admissions paying with Medicare and Medicaid, and 
total annual revenue from non-Medicare, non-Medicaid sources) and the 
market concentration for each California county as measured by its Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI).53  From this analysis, Lynk concludes, “nonprofit 
hospitals, whether private or public, have statistically significantly lower list and 
net prices than for-profit hospitals.”54  He further finds that nonprofit hospitals 
exhibit a lower association between market share and price, and that for-profit 
hospitals (and government hospitals) tend to raise their prices following a 
merger while non-profit hospitals tend to slightly reduce theirs.55  In conclusion, 
Lynk notes the evidence “suggests simply that we should think twice before 
assessing both for-profit and nonprofit hospital mergers with the same ex ante 
presumptions about their probable effects on price.”56 
 
hospitals were “well-maintained” and during which he became convinced that the Board of Directors 
will adhere to their “fiduciary responsibilities” to renovate and upgrade their facilities.  Id. at 1301.) 
 50. Lynk, Property Rights, supra note 49, at 372. 
 51. See id. at 366. 
 52. See id. at 368–70. 
 53. Lynk, Hospital Mergers, supra note 49, at 442–43, 445–46.  The sample excludes hospitals in Los 
Angeles County and federal hospitals because, Lynk reasoned, those institutions catered to outlier 
populations.  Id. at 442.  Kaiser hospitals and some others were also excluded because they do not 
release pricing data.  Price data was time-lagged from individual hospital data to allow for prices to 
adjust to market conditions.  Id. at 442. 
 54. Id. at 449, 452. 
 55. Id. at 453. 
 56. Id. at 459. 
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Lynk’s published work and his testimony in the merger cases sparked 
significant interest, particularly since his 1995 article was “the only published 
empirical study that provided direct evidence on the pricing behavior of 
nonprofit hospitals.”57  But within a few years following its release, a forceful 
backlash ensued.  Some initial controversy arose after Lynk’s 1995 article first 
appeared in the prestigious Journal of Law and Economics, when it was 
revealed that one of the article’s reviewers called Lynk’s study “seriously 
flawed,” and later said, “I was very surprised when I saw [the article] appear in 
print” because it had not been returned to him for review after he expressed his 
concerns.58  One year later, employees of the FTC and DOJ conducted a study 
that examined a different data sample and generated conflicting results, 
concluding instead that nonprofit hospitals in concentrated markets set prices 
that are statistically indistinguishable from for-profits.59  These lingering 
questions over Lynk’s findings, and the importance of the debate, prompted the 
Journal of Health Economics to dedicate three of its January 1999 articles to 
investigating the matter in greater detail—two by scholars critiquing (and 
attempting to replicate) Lynk’s findings and a third in which Lynk and a 
coauthor could respond to Lynk’s critics. 
In the first critique, RAND scholars Emmett Keeler, Glenn Melnick, and 
Jack Zwanziger replicate Lynk’s empirical analyses after introducing a series of 
methodological changes.60  This study assembles a larger dataset of California 
hospital discharge data that includes prices from four selected years between 
1986 and 1994, includes prices from hospitals in Los Angeles County, excludes 
discharge data for Medicare patients (since prices for those patients are 
determined by federal regulation, not market forces), and controls discharge 
prices for local wages using an area wage index derived for Medicare 
regulations.61  Implementing otherwise similar analyses, the researchers find that 
nonprofit-hospital mergers, just like mergers of government hospitals and for-
profit hospitals, “lead to higher prices, not lower ones,” and that these price 
increases grow over time.62  Although the RAND scholars’ results do not rebut 
Lynk’s findings that, in a given year, for-profit hospital pricing exhibits a 
 
 57. Glenn Melnick et al., Market Power and Hospital Pricing: Are Nonprofits Different?, HEALTH 
AFF., May–June 1999, at 167, 168. 
 58. Mary Chris Jaklevic, Ownership and Pricing, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Oct. 6, 1997, at 2, 16 
(quoting David Dranove of Northwestern University’s Kellogg Graduate School of Management).  
Additional controversy arose out of Lynk’s employment in the consulting group Lexecon because 
Dennis Carlton, one of the Journal of Law and Economics editors, was also one of Lexecon’s 
principals.  Id.  The journal’s editors, however, said Professor Carlton had recused himself when the 
editors selected Lynk’s article for publication.  See Dennis W. Carlton, Letter to the Editor, Professor: 
Article Was Misleading, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Dec. 1, 1997, at 52; Sam Peltzman, Letter to the 
Editor, Journal Story Gave Incomplete Account, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Oct. 20, 1997, at 28. 
 59. John Simpson, Fed. Trade Comm’n & Richard Shin, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Do Nonprofit 
Hospitals Exercise Market Power? 16 (Nov. 1996), http://www.ftc.gov/be/workpapers/wp214.pdf. 
 60. Emmett B. Keeler et al., The Changing Effects of Competition on Non-Profit and For-Profit 
Hospital Pricing Behavior, 18 J. HEALTH ECON. 69, 72–76 (1999). 
 61. Id. at 72–73. 
 62. Id. at 83. 
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stronger correlation with market concentration than nonprofit-hospital pricing, 
the results do suggest that those same nonprofits can be expected to raise prices 
after merging, and those price increases will rise in magnitude as the hospitals’ 
market shares increase. 
In the second critique, David Dranove and Richard Ludwick also attempt to 
improve and replicate Lynk’s 1995 analysis.63  They first identify two sources of 
empirical bias in Lynk’s empirical specification,64 and after correcting for both 
(plus making other minor corrections65) find that mergers of nonprofit hospitals 
are associated with, “[i]f anything,” higher prices.66 
Lynk’s response to the two critiques could be read as a bit of a retreat.  He 
and coauthor Lynette Neumann state that the central research question raised 
in Lynk’s 1995 article is not whether prices would rise after a merger of 
nonprofit hospitals (which is the question of central interest to competition 
policy), but rather, whether prices after a merger of nonprofit hospitals would 
be statistically different from the merger of similar for-profit hospitals.67  This 
alternative research perspective is critical because one could find, as the critics 
did, that mergers of nonprofit hospitals lead to inflated prices and anticonsumer 
outcomes while also statistically confirming that nonprofits price differently, 
perhaps less aggressively, than comparable for-profits.  With this second issue—
whether nonprofit hospitals are unique or different from for-profit 
institutions—in focus, Lynk and Neumann reinterpret both studies’ results to 
confirm, not contradict, Lynk’s earlier 1995 findings that nonprofit hospitals 
price systematically differently from for-profits.68  Their resulting conclusions 
 
 63. David Dranove & Richard Ludwick, Competition and Pricing by Nonprofit Hospitals: A 
Reassessment of Lynk’s Analysis, 18 J. HEALTH ECON. 87, 87 (1999). 
 64. The two sources of bias are Lynk’s simultaneous use of correlated coefficients and potential 
correlations due to omitted variables.  Id. at 88.  The first problem arises because both hospital market 
share and market concentration are used as explanatory variables, so a merger affects two—not one—
coefficients, thus creating a simultaneity bias (where it is hard to measure the movement in one 
coefficient while holding the other constant).  Id. at 88–89.  Dranove and Ludwick correct this bias by 
examining only post-merger prices set by merged hospitals.  Id. at 89.  The second problem is caused by 
Lynk’s failure to measure the severity of patients’ claims properly.  Id. at 90–91.  This might invite an 
omitted variable bias, such as if hospitals in highly concentrated markets specialized in delivering 
expensive care for severely ill patients.  Id.  Dranove & Ludwick correct for this source of bias by 
controlling illness severity by measuring the number of secondary diagnoses accompanying a hospital 
claim.  Id.  Dranove & Ludwick note that ideally, service quality should be controlled as well.  See id. at 
90–91. 
 65. Like Keeler et al., supra note 60, Dranove and Ludwick also exclude Medicare and Medicaid 
patient claims from the data but found the different sample still produced Lynk’s same results when 
Lynk’s empirical specification was used.  Id. at 92.  Dranove and Ludwick also restrict the sample to 
hospitals in markets with an HHI greater than 0.10, thus eliminating hospitals in highly diffuse markets.  
Id.  They otherwise make every effort to execute analyses identical to Lynk’s. 
 66. Id. at 97. 
 67. William J. Lynk & Lynette R. Neumann, Price and Profit, 18 J. HEALTH ECON. 99, 100–01 
(1999). 
 68. Id. at 101–08. Lynk & Neumann then reexamine pricing data from the Butterworth hospitals to 
reveal that updated analyses confirm Lynk’s testimony in that case that the nonprofit hospitals would 
price lower than comparable for-profits.  Id. at 108–10. 
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and implications for antitrust policy do not necessarily sound like a vigorous 
case for permissive merger policy: 
The policy question that our work addresses is simply whether the distinction between 
for-profit and nonprofit ownership matters, and therefore whether informed antitrust 
review of proposed hospital mergers should add that consideration to the checklist of 
other relevant considerations.69 
This debate spilled into the FTC when the Commission gathered scholarly 
testimony for its 2004 report, Improving Health Care: A Dose of Competition,70 
but the report’s drafters clearly tried to put the debate to rest.  The report first 
shares William Lynk’s testimony before the Commission, discussing his 
empirical work and his repeated conclusion “that nonprofits that attain market 
power behave differently from for-profits when it comes to pricing.”71  The 
report then continues, “By contrast, several panelists maintained that the best 
available empirical evidence indicated no significant differences between the 
pricing behavior of for-profit and nonprofit hospitals.”72  And, after listing the 
growing number of studies that reach that conclusion,73 the report concludes, 
Although institutional status has loomed large in debates and legal disputes, the best 
available evidence indicates that nonprofits exploit market power when given the 
opportunity to do so.  Accordingly, the profit/nonprofit status of the merging hospitals 
should not be considered a factor in predicting whether a hospital merger is likely to 
be anticompetitive.74 
With this, the FTC aimed to bring the Carilion–Freeman–Butterworth legacy to 
an end.  And at around the same time, it initiated its complaint against 
Evanston Northwestern Healthcare.75 
IV 
THE REAL PROBLEM: INSURANCE, MORAL HAZARD, AND CROSS-SUBSIDIES  
In attributing recent rises in health care costs to growing market power for 
providers, and to nonprofit hospitals in particular, Distributive Injustices 
 
 69. Id. at 101 (emphasis added).  On the question of the nature of ownership, however, Lynk & 
Neumann are far less conciliatory, maintaining there are institutional differences between for-profits 
and nonprofits that demand attention.  See id. at 110–11.  They assert in closing: 
[I]f a hospital were effectively controlled by those with interests parallel to the interests of 
hospital consumers, it is hard to see why those who control such a hospital would consciously 
choose to exercise any monopoly power that the hospital might possess.  To assume that they 
would willfully do so is to deny the principle of self-interest. 
Id. 
 70. IMPROVING HEALTH CARE, supra note 42. 
 71. Id. ch. 4 at 31. 
 72. Id. 
 73. The studies listed, in addition to those cited above, include: Robert Connor et al., The Effects 
of Market Concentration and Horizontal Mergers on Hospital Costs and Prices, 5 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 
159 (1998); Michael G. Vita & Seth Sacher, The Competitive Effects of Not-For-Profit Hospital Mergers: 
A Case Study, 49 J. INDUS. ECON. 63 (2001); Elaine Silverman & Jonathan Skinner, Medicare Upcoding 
and Hospital Ownership, 23 J. HEALTH ECON. 369 (2004).  See IMPROVING HEALTH CARE, supra note 
42, ch.4 at 32 nn.169–71. 
 74. IMPROVING HEALTH CARE, supra note 42, ch. 4, at 33. 
 75. See supra notes 45–46. 
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implicitly suggests the twin hopes that U.S. antitrust enforcement will become 
more rigorous and that the Carilion–Freeman–Butterworth line of cases will 
come to an end.  We are thus greatly skeptical of the position that nonprofit 
hospitals construct policies that incorporate the community’s preferences for 
low prices.  However, our analysis also suggests that those critical of Lynk’s 
research, and those who argue that nonprofits and for-profit hospitals price 
similarly, are also not entirely correct.  The central problem in the debate is that 
it asks the wrong question.  Academics—both Lynk and his critics—employ the 
wrong empirical tests and thus misinform merger policy. 
A. The Effects on Prices: Market Power Plus U.S.-Style Insurance 
The logic employed in the debate over Lynk’s findings is simple: market 
concentration through mergers gives firms the opportunity to raise prices; 
higher prices are contrary to consumer welfare and therefore warrant scrutiny 
from antitrust enforcers;76 but, if nonprofit hospitals with market power do not 
raise prices like for-profit hospitals with comparable market power, then 
vigorous antitrust scrutiny is less deserved. 
The problem with this syllogism is that the baseline reference is how a for-
profit monopolist would price.  Distributive Injustices argues, however, that the 
presence of health insurance should substantially alter the antitrust calculus. We 
observe, “U.S.-style private health insurance, by greatly weakening price 
elasticity of demand as a constraint on monopoly pricing by health care 
providers and suppliers, facilitates the latter’s exercise of market power, 
producing profits substantially exceeding the usual returns to lawful 
monopoly.”77  Consequently, monopoly power in the health care sector leads to 
prices that are more inflated than monopolies in other industries, and however 
concerning market concentration might normally be, its combination with 
health insurance is cause for particular alarm.  Thus, even assuming Lynk is 
correct that nonprofit hospitals with market power set prices statistically lower 
than for-profit hospitals with equal market power, it would be premature—and, 
we argue, grossly inaccurate—to conclude that merger review should be 
permissive.  To the contrary, the presence of health insurance means hospital 
market power—for nonprofits and for-profits alike—is a cause for great alarm 
and deserves heightened antitrust scrutiny. 
Under this alternative perspective, the appropriate empirical tests would 
assess the combination of market power and health insurance.  The crucial test 
to determine whether nonprofit-hospital market concentration is benign is to 
 
 76. Though antitrust law is chiefly concerned with matters of efficiency, the concern over higher 
prices fits neatly within our emphasis on distributive justice.  So, in addition to the traditional 
objections to a monopolist’s supracompetitive prices, we also detail how the health system redistributes 
wealth in undesirable ways, including the preponderance of inflated prices that channel dollars from 
middle-income consumers to wealthy providers.  Havighurst & Richman, supra note 2, at 14 (referring 
to the “regressive redistribution of income from consumers to producers”). 
 77. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 2, at 30. 
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compare nonprofit-hospital pricing in the presence of market power to 
nonprofit-hospital pricing in the absence of market power.  We predict that, 
because of how health insurance affects consumers’ price sensitivities, such a 
study would reveal a significant difference.  A second empirical test would 
examine the effect of insurance on prices.  For example, whether, controlling 
for market concentration, medical services that typically are not insured, such as 
elective cosmetic surgery, are priced differently from insured services.  These 
tests would not only evaluate our hypothesis but would appropriately inform 
antitrust policymakers when they should be concerned, and when they should 
be very concerned, about pockets of market power. 
Therefore, although we join the FTC’s chorus that warns of increasing 
market concentration in the health care industry, our insights regarding the 
combination of market power with U.S.-style health insurance both reshape and 
reemphasize the problem of market power.  Whether the monopolist is 
nonprofit can be only marginally relevant.  Of far greater antitrust concern is 
whether the monopolist serves a market covered by insurance. 
B. The Effects on Output: The Antitrust of Overconsumption 
However, even if one accepts our argument that health insurance enables 
hospitals with market power—nonprofit and for-profit alike—to charge 
supracompetitive prices, we also observe that U.S.-style insurance subsidizes 
demand such that (even obscenely) inflated prices do not prompt reductions in 
consumption of medical services.78  If the traditional antitrust concern over 
rising prices is that they lead to a reduction in output,79 one might argue that this 
unusual effect of insurance-stimulated demand might be reason to restrain, 
rather than reinvigorate, antitrust scrutiny. 
The health care industry, however, is an instance in which maximizing 
output does not translate into maximizing total surplus.  Distributive Injustices 
calls this the “too much of a good thing” problem.80  Even though rising prices 
might not reduce total output—and, in fact, total output might even achieve 
theoretically optimal levels if insurance co-payments are set at the marginal 
costs to deliver care—there are instead severe allocative inefficiencies, which 
are certainly a matter of antitrust concern.81  Since insurance-facilitated moral 
 
 78. Id. at 15 (“By effectively steepening the demand curve a monopolist faces, health insurance 
enhances the monopolist’s pricing freedom and ability to exploit consumers, enabling it to charge even 
more than the theoretical ‘monopoly price.’”); id. at 31 (describing “the tendency of insurance to 
induce consumption that would not otherwise occur”).  
 79. See, e.g., Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 107–08 (1984) 
(“Restrictions on price and output are the paradigmatic examples of restraints of trade that the 
Sherman Act was intended to prohibit.”); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad, Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 19–20 
(1979) (“[O]ur inquiry must focus on . . . whether the practice facially appears to be one that would 
always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output . . . .”). 
 80. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 2, at 24. 
 81. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 784–85 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (evaluating a 
restraint’s likely effect on prices to determine whether it is anticompetitive); ROBERT H. BORK, THE 
ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 91 (1978) (“The whole task of antitrust can be 
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hazard induces individuals to consume services at prices they otherwise would 
forgo,82 the ultimate price consumers pay for such services (including the 
appropriate portion of their insurance premiums) exceeds what consumers 
would otherwise choose for themselves in the presence of a well-working 
market and in the absence of insurance.83 Consequently, moral hazard and 
resulting overconsumption do not correct for antitrust problems created by 
inflated prices; rather, because they induce inefficient expenditures despite 
those prices, they are additional reasons for alarm. 
Overconsumption that benefits nonprofits creates a particularly difficult 
antitrust problem.  To be sure, inflated prices pervade the health care industry 
in areas occupied by both for-profit and nonprofit players, but monopoly rents 
created by for-profit monopolies are at least unrestrained to pursue efficient, 
market-driven uses.  Those born out of nonprofit monopolies, on the other 
hand, are restricted to remain in the health care system regardless of how 
efficient or inefficient such investments might be.  Ironically, nonprofits often 
justify their supracompetitive prices by claiming a need to finance other 
activities, such as charity care and research.  And indeed, this argument has 
been successful.  The court in Butterworth, for example, relaxed its antitrust 
scrutiny in part because the merging entities pledged to invest in new facilities 
and “to provide quality healthcare programs for the underserved . . . without 
regard to ability to pay.”84  However, if allocative efficiency is of any antitrust 
concern, courts scrutinizing proposed mergers of nonprofits should consider 
such cross-subsidies as a reason to oppose, not support, the mergers. 
In the end, courts have correctly noticed that nonprofit hospitals gather 
surplus through supracompetitive pricing and spend it on excess health care,85 
but whereas courts have deemed this to be admirable, and a reason to protect 
nonprofit hospitals from standard antitrust scrutiny, it in fact should be a reason 
to subject nonprofits to additional scrutiny.  Antitrust’s priority on allocative 
efficiency should cause courts to be very wary of market power in general, since 
inflated prices for health care services are likely to cause overconsumption to be 
inefficient, and to be particularly wary of market power enjoyed by nonprofits, 
since their monopoly rents are trapped in a system that might not offer efficient 
 
summed up as the effort to improve allocative efficiency without impairing productive efficiency so 
greatly as to produce either no gain or a net loss in consumer welfare.”). 
 82. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 2, at 31 (describing “the tendency of insurance to induce 
consumption that would not otherwise occur”). 
 83. This is particularly true when one considers the dynamic consequences of moral hazard, 
whereby subsidized demand stimulates investments in expensive new technologies in which many 
consumers would prefer not to invest.  See id. at 29; see also Mark Pauly, The Tax Subsidy to 
Employment-Based Health Insurance and the Distribution of Well-Being, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
83, 99–100 (Autumn 2006). 
 84. FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1300, 1306 (W.D. Mich. 1996), aff’d, 121 
F.3d 708 (6th Cir. 1997).  See also United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 146 
(E.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 85. This, in fact, is a precondition to obtaining nonprofit status.  See Schmalbeck, infra note 95 and 
accompanying text. 
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uses for those revenues.  Antitrust law has not recognized as a legitimate 
defense a claim by an otherwise illegal monopolist or cartel that its economic 
rents are spent toward socially useful applications,86 and arguments by nonprofit 
hospitals to justify their monopoly rents should meet similar skepticism.  By 
refocusing on allocative efficiency, antitrust law can play a constructive role in 
ending the misallocation of significant social resources by nonprofit hospitals. 
C. The Effects of Cost-Shifting: The Antitrust of Cross-Subsidies 
In addition to the regressivity of the health care system’s inflated prices and 
inefficiency of its subsidized overconsumption, Distributive Injustices finds other 
aspects of the growing market power accruing to nonprofit hospitals even more 
objectionable.  The roots of this additional concern over nonprofit market 
power lies in the article’s extensive discussion of cross-subsidies. 
Even if Lynk’s empirical analyses do have conspicuous shortcomings, his 
ultimate hypothesis contains some merit.  Since the surplus gained from a 
nonprofit’s supracompetitive prices does not pass on to shareholders, the 
proceeds remain within the health care system such that institutions can, and 
indeed must, “plow excess earnings back into the health care enterprise.”87  
Those excess earnings largely appear in the form of cross-subsidies for certain 
services that are dispensed either free of charge or at a reduced price.  
Consequently, even if one accepts the FTC’s conclusion that “nonprofits exploit 
market power when given the opportunity to do so,”88 and that nonprofit 
market power will surely lead to supracompetitive prices for some services, by 
necessity it means there will be reductions in prices for other services.  Put 
another way, Lynk is ultimately correct that nonprofits price differently than 
for-profits, even if his hypotheses are incorrect as applied to profit-generating 
services.89 
 
 86. But see United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 672 (3d Cir. 1993) (allowing “the undisputed 
public interest in equality of educational access and opportunity” to be considered as justification for a 
group of colleges’ collusion on financial aid).  For criticisms of Brown University, see Lee Goldman, 
The Politically Correct Corporation and the Antitrust Laws: The Proper Treatment of Noneconomic or 
Social Welfare Justifications Under Section 1 of The Sherman Act , 13 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 137, 148 
(1995) (“Even assuming that the defendants genuinely intend to benefit the public, they still cannot be 
trusted to balance properly the asserted public interest benefits against the resulting harms to 
competition so long as they receive direct financial advantages.”). 
 87. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 2, at 20. 
 88. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.  Judge Posner also holds this view, see supra, note 14, 
and Judge Easterbrook apparently does as well.  Easterbrook remanded a Sherman Act section 2 claim 
against Blue Cross/Blue Shield to determine whether the nonprofit defendants had sufficient market 
power to shift costs to rivals.  See Ball Mem’l Hosp. v. Mut. Hosp. Ins., 784 F.2d 1325, 1340–41 (7th Cir. 
1986). 
 89. It is possible that the surplus from supracompetitive prices is whittled away in inflated salaries, 
administrative inefficiencies, or undesired quality improvements.  See Havighurst & Richman, supra 
note 2, at 22–23 (“[I]n the absence of either market discipline or effective political oversight, there is no 
assurance that easily gained revenues will not be squandered in low-priority activities, in overpaying for 
inputs, or simply through managerial slack.”).  But this kind of waste can itself be characterized as a 
subsidy.  See id. 
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Though a nonprofit’s inflating some prices while reducing others can be 
objectionable under antitrust principles,90 Distributive Injustices’ criticism of 
such pervasive cross-subsidies provides a further justification for rigorous 
antitrust enforcement.  After listing the many activities that likely enjoy 
subsidies—including publicly minded services, such as uncompensated and 
undercharged care for the indigent and low-income, underpayments by 
Medicare and Medicaid, and other such “activities that the market would not 
otherwise support,” and less munificent services such as discounted medical 
instruction, research, and loss-leaders in growing markets that might translate 
into future market power and lucrative services91—Distributive Injustices 
observes, 
The buck obviously does not stop with the payer.  Instead, the heavy costs of activities 
unrelated to the care of the payer’s own patients are inevitably passed on to the 
working Americans more or less in proportion to the health insurance premiums that 
employers largely pay on their behalf.  The result is a well-entrenched method of 
financing important health-related activities, many of uncertain value, through what 
amounts to a hidden ‘head tax.’  True to the nature of such a tax, the burden is 
distributed more or less equally across all premium payers rather than in proportion to 
their wealth or income.92 
Antitrust law thus has the capacity to contain health care costs through 
mechanisms not commonly appreciated.  Antitrust enforcement has frequently 
been invoked to defeat collusion, entry barriers, and other mechanisms that 
prop prices above their competitive levels,93 but health care costs are driven not 
just by inflated prices, but also by hidden expenditures.  Curtailing the 
elaborate system of cross-subsidies that abound in nonprofit hospitals will bring 
more transparency to this process of doling out health care dollars.  Antitrust 
enforcement and merger review can bring market discipline to the health care 
system (in addition to compelling price competition) by subjecting many health-
industry services to the rigors of consumer preferences, ending their protection 
by secretive administrators, and enabling the value and sustainability of such 
services to be determined by market demand. 
The implication of this argument is that antitrust enforcers serve an 
important political purpose that extends far beyond combating inflated prices.  
If mitigating market power handicaps this system of cross-subsidies, then 
antitrust enforcement can keep the provision of public goods within the public 
political arena and thus subject to transparent policy debate.  It might also stem 
the reach and the magnitude of the health system’s hidden head tax.  However 
 
 90. See supra Part IV.B. 
 91. Havighurst & Richman, supra note 2, at 20–21. 
 92. Id. at 24. 
 93. See, e.g., FTC v. Ind. Fed. of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986) (holding a group of dentists 
liable for collectively refusing to submit x-rays to insurance companies and thus maintaining an 
information imbalance); Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 341, 357 (1982) 
(holding that “maximum” price-fixing by a group of doctors violates the Sherman Act); Am. Med. 
Ass’n v. FTC, 638 F.2d 443, 447 (1980) (reviewing an FTC order forbidding medical associations from 
interfering with doctors’ non-deceptive advertising). 
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desirable cross-subsidized activities might be, they persist by skirting the 
political process and collect their revenue regressively on the backs of working 
individuals.  Antitrust, seeking competition and efficiency, might also bring 
about a more democratic financing system if courts reviewing hospital mergers 
properly considered these aspects of cross-subsidies. 
Of course, disassembling the health care industry’s system of cross-subsidies 
is a daunting task.  The system is deeply rooted within accounting and delivery 
systems, and the powerful industry is highly incentivized to do what it can to 
maintain control over its captured rents.  But more importantly, the system of 
cross-subsidies enjoys the thorough protection of several legal authorities and 
has become part of the very fabric that defines nonprofit status.  As Professor 
Schmalbeck writes in this volume, the earliest revenue rulings determining 
whether hospitals were exempt from paying taxes actually hinged upon the 
maintenance of a healthy system of cross-subsidies.  On the seminal Revenue 
Ruling 56-185,94 which provided a list of “requirements” for exemption of a 
nonprofit hospital, Professor Schmalbeck writes: 
[T]he ruling explained that such a hospital “must be operated to the extent of its 
financial ability for those not able to pay for the services rendered . . . .”  The clear 
implication of the paragraph was that an exempt hospital was expected to engage in 
more or less explicit cross-subsidization among patient groups, with those who could 
afford treatment paying for the total costs of operating the hospital, including costs 
attributable to care for those who could not afford to pay the full costs, if they could 
indeed afford to pay anything at all.95 
Even now, cross-subsidies remain at the heart of nonprofit status in the 
health care sector—but as something the law requires, not something deemed 
undesirable.  For example, when health maintenance organizations (HMOs) 
sought nonprofit status, they encountered hostility when they suggested they 
deserved the tax exemption because they could provide care at more 
competitive costs.  Instead, the IRS and a recent Tenth Circuit ruling demanded 
“some additional ‘plus.’”96 Professor Schmalbeck explains that “[t]he 
amorphous ‘plus’ factor can vary, but the Tenth Circuit suggested that devoting 
surpluses to research or teaching, or providing free or below-cost services would 
normally qualify.”97 
The great irony in these tax cases and revenue rulings is that an entity must 
exercise market power in order to implement the cross-subsidies necessary to 
obtain tax exempt status; therefore, all entities that qualify for nonprofit status 
must necessarily exercise some market power.  But this irony, and the implicit 
alarm it sounds to antitrust law, is largely lost on the courts.  To the contrary, 
recent merger cases make explicit allowances, and impose implicit 
requirements, for nonprofit hospitals to engage in cross-subsidies.  For example, 
 
 94. Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202 (1956). 
 95. Schmalbeck, supra note 18, at 124 (internal citations omitted). 
 96. IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Comm’r, 325 F.3d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 2003). 
 97. Schmalbeck, supra note 18, at 128 (citing IHC Health Plans, 325 F.3d at 1197). 
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in permitting two nonprofit hospitals to merge in 1997, the Eastern District of 
New York explained, 
[B]oth hospitals provide millions of dollars worth of free medical care to individuals in 
need.  Any profit is funneled back into the community in the form of new programs 
and facilities. . . .  All of these beneficial factors support the defendants’ contention 
that community service[,] not profit maximization, is the hospitals’ mission.98 
In short, the hospitals’ cross-subsidies helped defend a merger, rather than 
serve as a troubling indication that the hospitals enjoyed market power.  Such 
language demonstrates how far courts have strayed from the central economic 
goals of antitrust law. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
This comment follows the plea issued in Distributive Injustices to pay closer 
attention to nonprofit health care institutions, including how the law has treated 
them, what empirical research reveals about them, and how money flows inside 
them.  Indeed, paying closer attention is instructive:  it reveals certain judicial 
predispositions toward health care institutions, the effect of market structure on 
health-services competition, and most of all, the meaningful economic and 
political damage that many nonprofit hospitals inadvertently inflict upon the 
health-services market.  From these observations, a series of antitrust 
arguments emerge that reason strongly for more rigorous scrutiny of proposed 
nonprofit hospital mergers.  No less than foundational antitrust principles—
lower prices, allocative efficiency, and market competition—are at stake.  In 
addition, increased scrutiny offers an opportunity for antitrust to reclaim 
important allocation decisions from health care institutions and return them to 
the democratic political process.  Hopefully, these arguments will join the many 
others to help turn the FTC’s hospital merger record around. 
 
 98. United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 146 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). 
